How do you know? · No. 02
How do you know two swaps are the same money?
One bridge said no. Four minutes later another said yes.
The memo gave it away.
A walk through one hour of the SingularityNET bridge hack, from File #008. Every claim below links to the record.
01 — The refusal
Chainflip got 100 ETH. It sent it back.
Sep 21, 2026, 00:35 UTC. The SingularityNET attacker's main wallet sent 100 ETH to a brand-new address, which put it into a Chainflip deposit channel seven minutes later: swap to Bitcoin, pay a named Bitcoin address. Three minutes after that, the 100 ETH came back.
Chainflip's own record of the swap: status FAILED, destination bc1qn0zn0rc6tq…, refund to 0x5f91…da19.
02 — Four minutes later
The refund went straight to THORChain. With a note attached.
At 00:49 the refund address sent 99.9997 ETH into THORChain's router. THORChain needs to be told what to do with a deposit, and the instruction is written into the transaction itself, in plain text, for anyone to read.
- VerifiedSame money. The refund arrived at 00:45; 99.9997 of its 99.9999 ETH left at 00:49 (the rest is gas). 0x866950b3…cfcfd0
- ProvenThe memo:
=:BTC.BTC:bc1qn0zn0rc6tqn5ct565us9885fj9zthm3sgz8g0f:319011496/5/0 - ProvenSame destination. It names the Bitcoin address the refused Chainflip swap had asked for.
A THORChain memo, read left to right. The address in it is the link.
03 — Where the two trails meet
One Bitcoin address. Then one collector.
At 01:26 the address in the memo received 3.31 BTC. At 01:40 it sent 3.25 BTC to bc1qfurwaq…a0nv, the same Bitcoin address that collected the four Chainflip swaps that did go through (5.55 BTC). Two bridges, one destination: the refused swap and the accepted ones end in the same wallet.
| Time (UTC) | What happened | Status | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| 00:35 | Attacker's main wallet sends 100 ETH to a new address. 0xa8511628…3b4756 | Verified | The start: money we already know is the attacker's. |
| 00:42 | 100 ETH into a Chainflip channel, asking for BTC to bc1qn0zn0r… | Proven | Chainflip's record names the destination and the refund address. |
| 00:45 | Chainflip refunds 99.9999 ETH to the refund address. | Verified | The refund address is the attacker's choice, so it is the attacker's. |
| 00:49 | Refund address → THORChain, memo names bc1qn0zn0r… | Proven | Same money, same destination, second bridge. |
| 01:26 | bc1qn0zn0r… receives 3.31 BTC. | Verified | The swap went through. |
| 01:40 | 3.25 BTC forwarded to the collector that also received the Chainflip payouts. | Verified | Both bridges feed one wallet: the trail is whole. |
| — | "Two swaps of about 100 ETH at about the same time." | Not proof | Similar amounts and timing alone link nothing. The proof is the refund address and the memo. |
04 — The method
Three habits that join trails. None of them is guessing.
- 1Read the service's own record. Chainflip, NEAR Intents and deBridge publish what each swap was asked to do: where from, where to, and where to refund. That record is stronger than any pattern we could spot ourselves.
- 2Follow the refunds. A refused swap returns money to an address the sender picked. The next move from that address is the sender's next move, often the same plan through another door.
- 3Read the memo. THORChain deposits carry their instructions in plain text. The destination address is in the transaction, on the sending chain, before anything arrives.