Onchain Files

How do you know? · No. 02

How do you know two swaps are the same money?

One bridge said no. Four minutes later another said yes.
The memo gave it away.

Public evidence only Link: proven on-chain Funds: gone to Bitcoin

A walk through one hour of the SingularityNET bridge hack, from File #008. Every claim below links to the record.

01 — The refusal

Chainflip got 100 ETH. It sent it back.

Sep 21, 2026, 00:35 UTC. The SingularityNET attacker's main wallet sent 100 ETH to a brand-new address, which put it into a Chainflip deposit channel seven minutes later: swap to Bitcoin, pay a named Bitcoin address. Three minutes after that, the 100 ETH came back.

Deposited · refunded 100ETH

Chainflip's own record of the swap: status FAILED, destination bc1qn0zn0rc6tq…, refund to 0x5f91…da19.

What Chainflip's record says
Asked forBTC to bc1qn0zn0r…
Statusfailed, refunded
A refund is a gift to an investigator.The refund goes to an address the sender chose. Whatever that address does next, the sender is doing.

02 — Four minutes later

The refund went straight to THORChain. With a note attached.

At 00:49 the refund address sent 99.9997 ETH into THORChain's router. THORChain needs to be told what to do with a deposit, and the instruction is written into the transaction itself, in plain text, for anyone to read.

  • VerifiedSame money. The refund arrived at 00:45; 99.9997 of its 99.9999 ETH left at 00:49 (the rest is gas). 0x866950b3…cfcfd0
  • ProvenThe memo: =:BTC.BTC:bc1qn0zn0rc6tqn5ct565us9885fj9zthm3sgz8g0f:319011496/5/0
  • ProvenSame destination. It names the Bitcoin address the refused Chainflip swap had asked for.
=:BTC.BTC:bc1qn0zn…8g0f:319011496/5/0 =swap BTC.BTCinto native bitcoin bc1qn0zn…8g0fpay this address 319011496at least 3.19 BTC 5/0stream in parts

A THORChain memo, read left to right. The address in it is the link.

03 — Where the two trails meet

One Bitcoin address. Then one collector.

At 01:26 the address in the memo received 3.31 BTC. At 01:40 it sent 3.25 BTC to bc1qfurwaq…a0nv, the same Bitcoin address that collected the four Chainflip swaps that did go through (5.55 BTC). Two bridges, one destination: the refused swap and the accepted ones end in the same wallet.

Time (UTC)What happenedStatusWhy it matters
00:35Attacker's main wallet sends 100 ETH to a new address. 0xa8511628…3b4756VerifiedThe start: money we already know is the attacker's.
00:42100 ETH into a Chainflip channel, asking for BTC to bc1qn0zn0r…ProvenChainflip's record names the destination and the refund address.
00:45Chainflip refunds 99.9999 ETH to the refund address.VerifiedThe refund address is the attacker's choice, so it is the attacker's.
00:49Refund address → THORChain, memo names bc1qn0zn0r…ProvenSame money, same destination, second bridge.
01:26bc1qn0zn0r… receives 3.31 BTC.VerifiedThe swap went through.
01:403.25 BTC forwarded to the collector that also received the Chainflip payouts.VerifiedBoth bridges feed one wallet: the trail is whole.
—"Two swaps of about 100 ETH at about the same time."Not proofSimilar amounts and timing alone link nothing. The proof is the refund address and the memo.

04 — The method

Three habits that join trails. None of them is guessing.

  • 1Read the service's own record. Chainflip, NEAR Intents and deBridge publish what each swap was asked to do: where from, where to, and where to refund. That record is stronger than any pattern we could spot ourselves.
  • 2Follow the refunds. A refused swap returns money to an address the sender picked. The next move from that address is the sender's next move, often the same plan through another door.
  • 3Read the memo. THORChain deposits carry their instructions in plain text. The destination address is in the transaction, on the sending chain, before anything arrives.
What this does not tell usWho the attacker is. It tells us that two bridges carried one person's money to one wallet, and which services hold the records that could say more. Those go privately to the people who can act.

05 — Your turn

Chainflip said no. THORChain said yes.

The full trail, every transaction and what is still sitting in the attacker's wallets: File #008. The first lesson, on identifying a hacker without a name: No. 01.