F1Created from nothing
Project-reported
At 13:53 UTC on Sep 6, a transaction in Liquid block 4,050,336 created about 4,000 L-BTC that had no bitcoin behind it. Blockstream traces it to the cache that remembers which proofs a node has already checked: the cache key left out parts of the transaction (a 2018 bug), and the fix published on Sep 1 joined the remaining fields without length markers, so two different transactions could share one key. No private keys were taken.
Evidence: Liquid mint tx f24a4b179b…183f (Blockstream incident assessment). Read from Blockstream; our engine does not read Liquid.
F2Out through the front door
VerifiedService named by Bitquery
The L-BTC was swapped out of Liquid through a peg-out service. At 14:28:56 UTC the federation paid 3,996.01834922 BTC from its reserve (83 inputs, 4,019.44 BTC) to an intermediate address, which forwarded 3,995.99999857 BTC to bc1ql4mfu6aundtkksxklfajs2h3t9nzcd6gyqjlte in the same block. Bitquery and Blockstream identify the service as SideSwap, which says its own keys were not compromised.
Evidence: Peg-out 8db751a650…b140, forward 85d2ca15be…5043 (block 965,783).
F3A rehearsal first
Verified
Two days earlier the attacker moved about 1.08 and 1.07 BTC into Liquid (Sep 4, 03:11 and 16:35 UTC). On the morning of Sep 6, small test peg-outs came back; at 14:01:57 UTC three of them, 2.4975 BTC, were combined into the attacker's address. Twenty-seven minutes later came the real one.
Evidence: Peg-ins f156fc7ee2…9a52, 4aa0ce4f15…858e; tests collected afff7f39a9…443b.
F4A negotiation written into Bitcoin
Verified
With no other channel, both sides wrote into OP_RETURN fields. 18:30 Sep 6, attacker: "we are whitehats. contact us on chain". 19:31, Blockstream: "Please contact security@blockstream.com". 02:20 Sep 7, attacker: "sending most back to bc1qdlld6…, is that ok". 03:30: "Please fix the bug first… Make sure every node is patched." Blockstream, signed: "Yes, thank you." 11:46: "Bridge nodes are patched, safe to return the funds." 12:43, attacker: "plz confirm again…". Several messages in between are PGP-encrypted. After the return, at 21:03: ":("
Evidence: Messages c103de9581…9a19, 91271efcbb…2fe8, 3a3eac4a26…80aa, 83825b2135…3c4b, 87dc0a2009…120c, 0256e33797…9016, d7e8837c51…6d52; 16 in total from the two addresses.
F53,400 back, 598.5 kept
VerifiedRefusal reported
At 16:09 UTC on Sep 7 the attacker sent 3,400 BTC back to the federation wallet and kept 598.49955894 BTC as change. On Sep 9 at 11:45 UTC another message demanded a 10% bug bounty "using your own money", or holders would bear a 15% loss. On Sep 11 Blockstream refused and said it would work with law enforcement and exchanges.
Evidence: Return a6d697a252…a46d; ransom message f7055f6c8d…9588 (block 966,199); refusal: The Block, Sep 11.
F6Still there
Verified
On Oct 6 the attacker's address held 598.5044 BTC: one output of 598.50010393 BTC, created by the Sep 9 message transaction and unspent since, plus about 0.0046 BTC of dust that strangers keep sending to it. More than 1,200 dust payments, many carrying spam messages, have landed on the address since; none of them is from the attacker.
Evidence: Address bc1ql4mfu6aundtkksxklfajs2h3t9nzcd6gyqjlte; output f7055f6c8d…9588:2. Read through mempool.space, Oct 6 05:46 UTC.