Onchain Files
File #008 · SingularityNET bridge: tokens from nothing, then four exitsMONITORINGv0.3 · findings locked · Oct 10, 2026

Billions of tokens from nothing. The last 145 ETH went to Bitcoin on Oct 10.

Stolen keys→8.7M FET + new tokens→Sold for ETH→Chainflip · THORChain · Monero→Bitcoin, into 2-of-2 multisig

On Sep 19–20 someone used signing keys of the SingularityNET bridge and partner projects (as reported) to drain 8.7M FET and mint about 2.3 billion AGIX, NTX, CGV and WMTx tokens out of nothing. They sold what the market would take for about 807 ETH, cashed out part of it to Bitcoin and to Monero, and left 448 ETH and 824M unsellable AGIX in two wallets. On Oct 8–9 the cash-out restarted: about 303 ETH left the main wallet, mostly to Bitcoin. On Oct 10 the last 144.5 ETH followed, through THORChain into Bitcoin, and the attacker's Bitcoin was merged and moved on in round 6 BTC and 3 BTC lots. Every figure below is tied to a transaction.

8.72MFETDrained from the bridge's converter in one transaction, Sep 19 20:21 UTC, and sold within the hour.
≈ 2.3BtokensMinted or released with stolen keys: 896M AGIX, 409M NTX, 492M CGV, 499M WMTx.
4minFrom Chainflip refusing a 100 ETH swap to the same 100 ETH going into THORChain, to the same Bitcoin address.
144.5ETHThe rest of the main wallet, 0x2dcc…1dfe, sent through THORChain to Bitcoin on Oct 10, 01:33–02:25 UTC. 0.54 ETH left. Watched.
MONITORING

Still held

20,657 USDC (BTC all moved)

Last spend

Oct 9 (BTC); Oct 9 (main wallet)

Exits

THORChain, Chainflip, NEAR Intents, Monero

Last checked

Oct 13

The findings are locked. The status bar updates when the watched addresses move. Additions are logged below.

Update v0.3 · Oct 10, 2026. Main wallet emptied. On Oct 10, 01:33–02:25 UTC, the last 144.5 ETH went through four fresh wallets into THORChain and came out as Bitcoin. That Bitcoin was merged with the attacker's earlier BTC and moved on as round 6 BTC and 3 BTC lots through 2-of-2 multisig addresses. By 05:14 UTC all of it had moved on; 20,657 USDC (freezable by Circle) is still sitting.

Update v0.2 · Oct 9, 2026. Second cash-out. On Oct 8–9 about 303 ETH left the main wallet, mostly to Bitcoin. Chainflip refused 8 of 10 swaps; the refunds went to THORChain instead. 145 ETH, ≈ 7 BTC and 20,657 USDC are still sitting. Part of the money reached exchange accounts; details went privately to the affected team.

Current exposure

Stolen$1.9M
Returned—
Frozen—
Still traceable≈ $610K

Where it can still be stopped

  • Issuer freeze possible · ≈ $21K still in USDT/USDC, which Tether and Circle can blacklist.
  • Monitored, not freezable today · AGIX held in self-custody. If it reaches an exchange or a service, that is the moment to act; we watch for it around the clock.
  • Law enforcement · a full evidence pack (every transaction, CSV) is available on request.

The claim

"Fetch.ai contracts were not under threat."

Fetch.ai, Sep 20, as reported by Crypto Times Project-reported

"the majority of the signing keys involved have not been changed"

Bitquery, as reported by AltcoinBuzz Attributed

The evidence

  • Verified

    8,721,530 FET left the bridge converter (0xab42…f3a3) for the attacker's main wallet in one transaction, Sep 19 20:21 UTC, called by an old wallet that had worked with the NTX contract since 2021.

  • Verified

    408.5M NTX, 896M AGIX and 492M CGV were minted to two attacker wallets; 499M WMTx arrived from contract 0x63bb…d392.

  • Verified

    Selling them through MetaMask Swap brought about 807 ETH; 289,575 USDC was pulled from a separate contract through one of its operator wallets.

  • Direct link

    Chainflip paid 5.55 BTC for four swaps and refused a fifth (100 ETH); THORChain's memo shows the refunded 100 ETH sent to the same Bitcoin address four minutes later.

  • Verified

    Another 100 ETH became 266,102 USDC, crossed to Arbitrum through Circle's CCTP, and bought about 4,560 FXMR (a Monero token) on Hyperliquid.

The unknown

  • Unknown

    How the keys were obtained.

  • Unknown

    Where the Bitcoin went after the attacker's collector split it (one part through a CoinJoin-style transaction).

  • Unknown

    Who controls the high-volume wallet that received 85,000 USDC.

  • Unknown

    Who the attacker is.

01 · The window

Keys first, coins second, exits last.

Sep 19–21, 2026, UTC. Gas swept from the stolen keys' own wallets, then the FET drain and the mints, then the sales, then the exits.

2026-09-19 · UTC

Hover a marker for the transaction

Chart loading…

Sep 19 only; the AGIX, CGV and WMTx mints followed on Sep 20 between 03:13 and 04:34 UTC, the exits on Sep 20–21.

02 · Key findings

What the chain shows.

F1

The keys, not the code

VerifiedGas sweep inferredCause reported

Nothing was hacked in the usual sense: every action used a key that was allowed to do it. At 19:32–19:38 UTC on Sep 19 the attacker's main wallet 0x2dcc…1dfE received small amounts of ETH and BNB from about fifteen wallets, among them the address that minted NTX an hour later and the operator wallet that later released USDC: most likely the stolen keys' own gas money. At 20:21 an old wallet (0x1572…c362, active with the NTX contract since 2021) called the bridge converter and moved 8,721,530 FET to the main wallet. Reports attribute it to a compromised bridge authorizer key and a separate NuNet mint key.

Evidence: FET drain 0xfe12c63b…69e2; NTX mint 0xe14442f6…13ab (signed by the minter key); Crypto Times, AltcoinBuzz.

F2

Mint, then sell what sells

Verified

Over the next eight hours: 408.5M NTX minted to the main wallet; 260M AGIX to the main wallet and 636M to a second wallet; 492M CGV to the second wallet; 499M WMTx from contract 0x63bb…d392. Through MetaMask Swap the main wallet sold the FET, most of the NTX and 21.7M AGIX for 699.8 ETH and 13.1 WETH; the second wallet sold WMTx, AGIX and CGV for 93.7 ETH. Prices collapsed quickly; most of the AGIX is still unsold.

Evidence: First FET sale 0x98f6e59b…6d1c; AGIX mints 0x494a123e…8fb3, 0x83e8f3b3…bced; CGV 0x789396ec…8116; WMTx 0x06e4a1b1…d26d.

F3

A side door for USDC

Verified

At 13:10 UTC on Sep 20, 289,575 USDC left a separate contract (0x7ffe…566b) through one of its operator wallets and went straight to the second attacker wallet, in the same minute.

Evidence: 0xca9facda…e66f.

F4

Chainflip said no. THORChain said yes, four minutes later

Direct link

Chainflip's records show five swaps to Bitcoin from fresh wallets fed by the attacker: 10,000, 75,000 and 118,015 USDC and 93.7 ETH completed for 5.549 BTC in total. The fifth, 100 ETH, was refused and refunded at 00:45 UTC on Sep 21. At 00:49 the refund address sent the same 99.9997 ETH into THORChain with the memo "=:BTC.BTC:bc1qn0zn0rc6tqn5ct565us9885fj9zthm3sgz8g0f": the Bitcoin address the refused Chainflip swap had named. That Bitcoin address received 3.31 BTC at 01:26.

Evidence: Chainflip deposits 0x005b886e…f6f8, 0xb4d87103…9e2a, 0x523d2e0d…29c3, 0x643f97ab…2903; refused 0x5b883c6d…1ef5, refund 0x203401ac…7b17; THORChain 0x866950b3…cfd0.

F5

100 ETH to Monero, in thirty minutes

VerifiedRedemption inferred

The other 100 ETH took a longer road: a fresh wallet, a service that sent it back three hours later, a smart account that swapped it on Uniswap for 266,102 USDC at 04:53, Circle's CCTP to Arbitrum at 04:54, Hyperliquid's bridge at 05:12, and seven buys of FXMR, a Monero token on Hyperliquid, sent on to an account that collects FXMR from many users, most likely for redemption into Monero. By 05:23 it was gone.

Evidence: Uniswap 0xccb562e6…ea0e; CCTP burn 0xcdb9a07a…d295 (minted on Arbitrum to 0x84c8…adae); Hyperliquid account 0x84c8…adae.

F6

Bitcoin, gathered and split

VerifiedOnward: not traced

All Bitcoin payouts, 8.74 BTC, were gathered at bc1qfu…a0nv by 01:40 UTC on Sep 21 and split again within hours. One 0.13 BTC piece went into a 209-input, 269-output transaction made of 0.5 BTC outputs, the shape of a CoinJoin. We have not followed the rest.

Evidence: Collector bc1qfurwaq4ca3avauvq4pcwthd78epdu73dmva0nv.

F7

Oct 8–9: the second cash-out, and eight refusals

VerifiedDirect link

After two quiet weeks, about 303 ETH left the main wallet on Oct 8–9, in 1–50 ETH pieces through fresh one-time wallets. Ten pieces went to Chainflip asking for Bitcoin. Chainflip's broker refused eight of them (228 ETH) and refunded each within minutes; seven refunds went straight into THORChain, to the same Bitcoin addresses (≈ 208 ETH). Two swaps (25 ETH) went through Chainflip. Smaller pieces were swapped to USDT and USDC and routed through NEAR Intents and Circle's bridge. About 6.98 BTC from these swaps then sat unmoved until Oct 10. Part of the money reached exchange accounts; we have shared those details privately with the affected team.

Evidence: Chainflip status API (TransactionRejectedByBroker + refund tx), THORChain OUT memos, Etherscan, Blockstream balances read Oct 9 12:45 UTC. Example: 50 ETH deposit 0x5d039aa5ce764c7ac2bdd7328bd3e2430f89b30843fb38219e96dc60ba696eb8 → refused → THORChain 0x14f08b5a52444410734d2b0e7e8713844b189ea38a0199c3626af35b75e57f4b.

F8

What is still there

Verified

On Oct 10 between 01:33 and 02:25 UTC the main wallet 0x2dcc…1dfe sent 144.5 ETH to four fresh wallets (20, 25, 50 and 49.5 ETH). Two swapped to USDT first (49,779 and 124,499 USDT); all four deposited into THORChain's router for Bitcoin. 0.54 ETH is left. THORChain's Bitcoin payouts (memos OUT:F91E…, OUT:926A…, OUT:EDC9… and others) were forwarded to bc1qe5pj…utp, which at 02:38 UTC was spent together with the attacker's earlier Bitcoin addresses (bc1qtztn…, bc1qxkh6…, bc1qyryz…, bc1qvh6e…) in one 12-input transaction. From there 6.00000000 BTC (02:38) and 3.00000000 BTC (04:27) went into fresh 2-of-2 multisig addresses that were emptied 15–20 minutes later, the same pattern as the round 1.00000000 BTC lots on Oct 9. Who holds the second key is not public. At 05:14 UTC the last 1.26 BTC followed into another 2-of-2 address, and at 04:34 one of the Oct 9 round 1 BTC lots moved on too: no attacker Bitcoin is left sitting at an address we can name. The second wallet 0x83f4…09c5 still holds 625.9M AGIX and 20,657 USDC, which Circle can freeze. 824M AGIX made from nothing stays unsellable at scale.

Evidence: Outgoing transactions of 0x2dcc read from the explorer's transaction list (not token logs: the wallet receives dozens of fake look-alike transfers). Bitcoin read via Blockstream / mempool.space; THORChain memos read from the OP_RETURN of each payout. Read Oct 10, 05:00–05:30 UTC.

03 · The whole trail

Every edge shows its evidence. Click one.

A grey line is a transfer we read on-chain. A dotted box is a name taken from a public label, a verified contract name or a service's own record. Times UTC.

SEP 19–20 ATTACKER SOLD EXITS NOW (OCT 10) Bridge converter8.72M FET MintsAGIX · NTX · CGV · WMTx USDC contract289,575 USDC Main wallet0x2dcc…1dfe Second wallet0x83f4…09c5 MetaMask Swap≈ 807 ETH out Chainflip5.55 BTC · 1 refused THORChainSep 21 + Oct 8–10 Hyperliquid→ Monero Bitcoin→ 2-of-2 multisig, Oct 10 Still held20,657 USDC + 824M AGIX

Click or tap any line in the map to see its evidence: status, transactions, time and amount.

Verified transferDirect cross-chain linkInferred linkNamed by label

04 · Evidence map

Every link, and what supports it.

LinkEvidenceStatus
Converter → main wallet8,721,530 FET, one txVerified
Mintsfrom the zero address / WMTx bridgeVerified
Second wallet → ChainflipChainflip's own recordsDirect link
Refused swap → THORChainmemo names the same Bitcoin addressDirect link
100 ETH → Monero tokenUniswap, CCTP message, Hyperliquid ledgerVerified
Cause: stolen keyspress and security firmsProject-reported
Verified
  • 8.72M FET drained; ≈ 2.3B tokens minted or released
  • ≈ 807 ETH from sales
  • 448 ETH + 824M AGIX still in two wallets
Project-reported
  • Keys compromised (reports)
Unknown
  • How the keys leaked
  • Where the Bitcoin ended
  • Who the attacker is

Every step used a key that was allowed to do it. The fix is key management, not code.

05 · Timeline

In order.

Sep 19 · 19:32Gas swept from about fifteen key wallets
Sep 19 · 20:218,721,530 FET drained from the converter
Sep 19 · 20:50408.5M NTX minted
Sep 20 · 03:13260M AGIX minted; 636M more at 04:17
Sep 20 · 04:34492M CGV minted
Sep 20 · 06:51Fetch.ai: its contracts were not under threat
Sep 20 · 13:10289,575 USDC pulled from a separate contract
Sep 20 · 21:15First Chainflip swap to Bitcoin
Sep 21 · 00:45Chainflip refuses 100 ETH; 00:49 it goes into THORChain
Sep 21 · 05:23266k USDC ends as a Monero token on Hyperliquid
Oct 6448 ETH and 824M AGIX still in two wallets
Oct 8 · 11:05Cash-out restarts: first of ten Chainflip deposits from one-time wallets
Oct 9 · 00:2050 ETH refused by Chainflip at 00:22; in THORChain at 00:27, same BTC address
Oct 10 · 01:33144.5 ETH leaves the main wallet in four parts; all of it deposited into THORChain by 02:25
Oct 10 · 02:38THORChain Bitcoin merged with the attacker's earlier BTC; 6 BTC into a 2-of-2 multisig address
Oct 10 · 04:273 BTC into a second 2-of-2 address; the last 1.26 BTC follows at 05:14. 20,657 USDC still sitting

06 · Ledger

The transactions.

The key transactions in this File, oldest first. The full list is in the CSV.

Transactions
UTCEventAmountTransaction
Sep 19 · 19:37NTX from an old NTX wallet24.3M NTX0xf201ae59…1dcf
Sep 19 · 20:21FET drained from the converter8,721,530 FET0xfe12c63b…69e2
Sep 19 · 20:24FET sold (MetaMask Swap)→ ETH0x98f6e59b…6d1c
Sep 19 · 20:50NTX minted408.5M NTX0xe14442f6…13ab
Sep 20 · 03:13AGIX minted (main)260M AGIX0x494a123e…8fb3
Sep 20 · 03:46WMTx in (second)WMTx0x06e4a1b1…d26d
Sep 20 · 04:17AGIX minted (second)636M AGIX0x83e8f3b3…bced
Sep 20 · 04:34CGV minted492M CGV0x789396ec…8116
Sep 20 · 13:10USDC pulled289,575 USDC0xca9facda…e66f
Sep 21 · 00:01Chainflip deposit93.7 ETH0x643f97ab…2903
Sep 21 · 00:35Main wallet sends100 ETH0xa8511628…4756
Sep 21 · 00:42Chainflip deposit (refused)100 ETH0x5b883c6d…1ef5
Sep 21 · 00:49Refund into THORChain99.9997 ETH0x866950b3…cfd0
Sep 21 · 04:53Uniswap: ETH → USDC266,102 USDC0xccb562e6…ea0e
Sep 21 · 04:54CCTP burn to Arbitrum266,102 USDC0xcdb9a07a…d295
Oct 10 · 01:33Main wallet → fresh wallet (then USDT → THORChain)20 ETH0x7fa233e8…ddaf
Oct 10 · 01:45Main wallet → fresh wallet (then THORChain)25 ETH0x9d2cd21a…bee5
Oct 10 · 02:16Main wallet → fresh wallet (then USDT → THORChain)50 ETH0x5549b198…2750
Oct 10 · 02:18Main wallet → fresh wallet (then THORChain)49.5 ETH0x549dcad4…ba84
Oct 10 · 02:25THORChain deposit49.4998 ETH0x5acebc26…b114
Oct 10 · 02:38BTC merged; 6 BTC into 2-of-2 multisig6.00000000 BTC075f05b01e…0650
Oct 10 · 04:273 BTC into 2-of-2 multisig; 1.26 BTC change3.00000000 BTCb8d8e7d4a8…d54d
Oct 10 · 05:14Last 1.26 BTC into a 2-of-2 multisig address1.26369788 BTC936a188e9e…400c

Download every transaction behind this File (CSV): chain, time, from, to, amount, status and an explorer link for each. Check any line yourself.

07 · Method and standard

How we know.

Ethereum transfers, token mints and balances read through Etherscan's API and public RPC by the Onchain Files engine (native ETH ledgers ignore look-alike tokens). Chainflip swaps from Chainflip's public status API; the THORChain memo decoded from the router call; the CCTP message decoded from the burn transaction; Hyperliquid activity from its public info API; Bitcoin through mempool.space. Contract names are verified-contract or Etherscan labels. Cause, statements and PeckShield's valuation as reported by Crypto Times and AltcoinBuzz. Read Oct 6, 2026.

Verified

Read on-chain by us. A direct link is proven by records on both chains.

Inferred

Our deduction from patterns. The method is stated.

Attributed

Someone else's claim or label. The source is named.

Project-reported

A statement from the project involved.

Unknown

What we could not establish, listed.

Sources