Onchain Files

Track record

What we said, and when.

Every File and every update we published, newest first. Updates carry the time we published them; a File without a publication date is listed at its incident date. Findings are locked once published; corrections are logged as updates, never edited away.

Impact

What we sent, and what happened.

Leads we handed privately to victims, services and responders. Recipients are named by role only; details stay private. 9 sent so far, 1 with an answer.

Oct 7, 2026 · File #012 · to security responders

Reported the ongoing poisoning operation (3 thefts, full infrastructure list for blocklists) to security responders' threat-intelligence desk

Outcome: ticket open

Oct 7, 2026 · File #012 · to public

Found and published a third theft by the same poisoning machine (35,200 USDT, same gas wallet) before any public report, with every transaction

Outcome: posted; File #012 updated to v1.2

Oct 7, 2026 · File #008 · to affected project

Told the affected project privately about stolen funds that may still be freezable, with the address and transactions

Outcome: sent

Oct 7, 2026 · File #012 · to public

Replied publicly under a security firm's alert, linking the new theft to the same poisoning operation (same gas wallet) and to File #012

Outcome: posted; File #012 updated to v1.1

Oct 6, 2026 · File #012 · to security responders

Warned security responders (Scam Sniffer, SEAL 911) about a second poisoning victim and an ongoing targeting, with the operation's infrastructure for blocklists

Outcome: sent

Oct 6, 2026 · File #007 · to swap service

Flagged a swap-service payout to the attacker, with the transaction, so the order record could be preserved

Outcome: replied: will block and disclose on a law-enforcement request

Oct 6, 2026 · File #007 · to victim

Sent the victim a private lead: exchange withdrawals that funded the attacker's route

Outcome: sent

Oct 6, 2026 · to victim

Sent the victim a private lead on stolen funds that could still be acted on (Payy bridge exploit)

Outcome: sent

Oct 6, 2026 · to victim

Sent the victim a private lead on where part of the stolen funds went (Blink exploit)

Outcome: sent

Oct 13, 2026

File #015 · Update v1.4

Rounds 4–7 through Tornado Cash, and USDC that can still be frozen. Since Oct 11 the ETH kept going through Tornado Cash in rounds. Withdrawals that match the attacker's deposits by pool and timing were swapped to USDC: 1,586,448 USDC at 0x4600…2a6a (rounds 4–5) and 100,533 USDC at 0xbFAD…55a6 (round 6) are still sitting, and we asked Circle publicly to freeze both on Oct 12. 71.5 ETH went through NEAR Intents into shielded Zcash. On Oct 12–13, 1,944 ETH from round-6 withdrawals was gathered back into one wallet, 0xb6af…a9c8. Round 7 started Oct 13 at 06:46 UTC with 80 ETH pieces from 0xfa4e…b0e2. Read Oct 13, 12:18 UTC: ≈ 6,780 ETH still in the original wallets, ≈ 204 BTC unmoved.

Oct 13, 2026

File #012 · Update v1.3

The look-alikes are empty; the operator keeps collecting. All three public victims' look-alike wallets have sent their ETH on. On Oct 10 the operation gathered ≈ 179.7 ETH into one wallet, and on Oct 12 another look-alike caught 5,000 USDC from a victim and swapped it to ETH. The Tornado-funded wallet behind the operation still holds ≈ 328 ETH. Every wallet is watched.

Oct 13, 2026

File #004 · Update v1.4

A second mixing wave. At 00:36 UTC on Oct 13, nineteen watched holdings were spent in ten transactions, each making a lot of exactly 10 BTC (116.6 BTC). The lots were split into 3 BTC and 7 BTC pieces, and between 02:36 and 06:00 UTC ≈ 84 BTC went into CoinJoin rounds. About 200 BTC has now been mixed since Oct 8. A fresh count at 12:30 UTC: ≈ 3,322 BTC still unspent across the 1,995 addresses (≈ 86 BTC also moved on Oct 11). We keep following the pieces that have not been mixed.

Oct 11, 2026

File #015 · Update v1.3

Third Tornado Cash round, and the USDD is gone. From 09:43 UTC on Oct 11 two of the six ETH wallets sent 199.1 and 199.2 ETH to fresh wallets, which deposited ≈ 398 ETH into Tornado Cash's 10, 1 and 0.1 ETH pools within 15 minutes. On TRON the last of the 5,000,002 USDD left both wallets (08:27 and 09:06 UTC): each batch went to a wallet created minutes before, was swapped to USDT and sent on to one of two busy service wallets that also handle many unrelated customers. No issuer froze it on the way. ≈ 9,330 ETH and ≈ 203 BTC are still sitting.

Oct 10, 2026

File #015 · Update v1.2

Second Tornado Cash round. From 09:42 UTC on Oct 10, three of the six ETH wallets sent ≈ 1,360 ETH (468.9, 441.5 and 450 ETH), each through one fresh wallet that split it into four 96–120 ETH pieces for Tornado Cash's 100, 10 and 1 ETH pools, the same pattern as Oct 9. On Bitcoin the ≈ 9.6 BTC collection wallet was emptied overnight in small hops; the two big BTC addresses (≈ 203 BTC) have not moved. On TRON 2.55M of the 5M USDD moved in 500k–1M batches, each through a fresh wallet and a SunSwap trade into USDT. ≈ 9,730 ETH, ≈ 203 BTC and 2.45M USDD are still sitting.

Oct 10, 2026

File #008 · Update v0.3

Main wallet emptied. On Oct 10, 01:33–02:25 UTC, the last 144.5 ETH went through four fresh wallets into THORChain and came out as Bitcoin. That Bitcoin was merged with the attacker's earlier BTC and moved on as round 6 BTC and 3 BTC lots through 2-of-2 multisig addresses. By 05:14 UTC all of it had moved on; 20,657 USDC (freezable by Circle) is still sitting.

Oct 9, 15:15 UTC

File #005 · Update v0.3

On Oct 9 the holding wallet completed its withdrawals on Ethereum: 1 wstETH at about 11:50 UTC (tx 0xf3303041…b088) and 1,000 wstETH at about 13:54 UTC (tx 0xd17830a8…b681). Two minutes later, at 13:55:53 UTC, it sent its last 782.067 wstETH on Base into the same bridge (tx 0xb59dbbcc…e669). At 15:10 UTC it held 1,001 wstETH on Ethereum, unmoved, and nothing on Base. The 1,000 wstETH took about five days to clear the bridge, faster than the seven days we estimated.

Oct 9, 2026

File #015 · Update v1.1

Into Tornado Cash. The ≈ 1,266 ETH that left the consolidation wallets at 15:04–15:45 UTC was split across 13 fresh wallets and deposited into Tornado Cash's 100, 10 and 1 ETH pools: ≈ 1,250 ETH by about 16:00 UTC. ≈ 11,090 ETH, ≈ 213 BTC and 5M USDD are still sitting.

Oct 9, 2026

File #013 · Update v1.1

Closed. At 08:54 UTC on Oct 9, 15,000 BNB went back to the return address the team had named in its own on-chain messages. Under the team's terms the sender keeps the rest (≈ 1,249 BNB, 7.7%) as a bounty. Scammers tried to divert the return with look-alike addresses and a fake "25% bounty" message: see the last finding.

Oct 9, 2026

File #008 · Update v0.2

Second cash-out. On Oct 8–9 about 303 ETH left the main wallet, mostly to Bitcoin. Chainflip refused 8 of 10 swaps; the refunds went to THORChain instead. 145 ETH, ≈ 7 BTC and 20,657 USDC are still sitting. Part of the money reached exchange accounts; details went privately to the affected team.

Oct 9

File #004 · Update v1.3

The mixing has started. On Oct 8 at 08:38 UTC, in one block, twelve transactions each sent exactly 10 BTC (120 BTC) from watched holdings to fresh addresses. Each chunk was split into 1–4 BTC pieces and, within hours, fed into large CoinJoin rounds (106–357 inputs) whose outputs use Wasabi-style standard amounts (0.5 BTC, 3.874 BTC = 318 sats). By Oct 9, 01:27 UTC ≈ 116 of the 120 BTC had gone through at least 14 rounds; the rest sits in fresh addresses we watch. Bitcoin count re-run: ≈ 3,481 BTC still unspent (≈ 127 BTC moved Oct 5–9). Amounts out of a CoinJoin can no longer be followed one-to-one; we keep watching what has not yet been mixed.

Oct 7, 09:30 UTC

File #012 · Update v1.2

A third strike, this morning. At 07:41:35 UTC a wallet sent 35,200 USDT to the look-alike 0x7828…2539. 24 seconds later the same Tornado-funded gas wallet, 0x6ad4…6de2, sent it 0.0002 ETH for gas; at 07:42:59, 84 seconds after the payment, the USDT was swapped on Uniswap for 13.35 ETH, which is still there and watched. Three victims in about 21 hours, $77,204 in total, all fuelled by the same gas wallet. We found this one ourselves from the gas wallet's transactions; we are not aware of a public report yet.

Oct 7, morning

File #012 · Update v1.1

The same machine struck again, 12 hours later. Scam Sniffer reported a second public victim: 12,000 USDC sent to the look-alike 0xbc3a…4686 on Oct 6 at 23:28 UTC. 84 seconds later the look-alike received its gas from the same Tornado-funded wallet as the first theft, 0x6ad4…6de2, and 2 minutes after that the USDC was swapped to 4.45 ETH. Same gas wallet, same swap-within-minutes playbook. The 4.45 ETH is still there and is now watched.

Oct 6, evening

File #007 · Update v0.3

Chainflip settled. Chainflip's public swap records show its three Ethereum payouts (253.8 ETH) were for the attacker's Bitcoin: 2, 3 and 3.1 BTC in, with the attacker's Bitcoin wallet as refund address. This was an open question in v0.2.

Oct 6, afternoon

File #007 · Update v0.2

The Tron leg is no longer open. The 476,058 USDT was swapped on SunSwap into TRX, and between 09:08 and 09:27 UTC the wallet made 16 deposits of about 100,000 TRX (1,589,000 TRX in total) into one unverified contract. In the same minutes Relay's solver paid the Ethereum collector 12.69, 12.68, 12.69, 12.70 … ETH, which is what 100,000 TRX was worth then (Inferred: amounts and timing match; Relay's API does not resolve the deposit IDs). Nothing is left on Tron.

Oct 6

File #004 · Update v1.2

Checked on-chain after our public-source sweep. Freezes confirmed: Tether and Circle have blacklisted 0xe07b…7d57 (Etherscan: "Bitget Exploiter 8"), which still holds 218,022.97 USDT and 99,989.91 USDC (≈ $318K, frozen). Its ETH, about 1,528 ETH including 170.47 ETH moved two days after the freeze, went on to 0xa6dd…5545 and the THORChain route. The first transfer was 0.84 ETH at 18:31:11 UTC from "Bitget 6" (tx 0xc195…7be6); Bitget's CEO later described a 0.184 ETH test, but the chain shows 0.84. TRON: the receiving address Bitget published, TBWN…YwKD, paid its TRX to the same 22 wallets our TRON leg already follows; it is now watched. New context below: the cause as reported by SlowMist and Mandiant, and Bitget's recovery bounty.

Oct 5, 12:15 UTC

File #002 · Update v0.2

File closed. The bounty deadline (Oct 3, 18:00 UTC) passed with no movement on the watched addresses: the attacker wallet still holds ≈ 0.010 ETH and the fresh address ≈ 0.098 ETH; the rest stays in Railgun, where the chain no longer shows it. We stopped watching on Oct 5. If anything moves or is returned, we will reopen this file.

Oct 5, evening

File #004 · Update v1.1

Two legs resolved after publication. TRON: the stolen TRX was swapped to USDT and bridged through USDT0 to 15 Ethereum wallets (≈ 6.06M USDT), then into THORChain and Chainflip: no longer an open end. ≈ 864.6k USDC sent through LayerZero landed directly in Chainflip deposit addresses on Arbitrum (5 swaps, 10.28 BTC). Chainflip total: 126 swaps, ≈ 325.1 BTC. New Bitcoin count: 3,815.59 BTC entered 213 attacker-named addresses; ≈ 3,607.82 BTC still unspent across 1,995 addresses.

Oct 4, 13:45 UTC

File #005 · Update v0.2

At 12:10:59 UTC the holding wallet sent a second transaction to the same wstETH bridge it used for the 1-coin test (tx 0x7b856099…3e14). Its balance fell from 1,782.067 to 782.067 wstETH, so about 1,000 wstETH is now on the slow route to Ethereum, where it can be released no earlier than about Oct 11. 782.067 wstETH remains on Base. We are watching both sides.

Incident · Oct 4, 2026

File #005 · Base vault exploit: 1,783 wstETH

An unnamed Base vault drained of 1,783 aBaswstETH in 17 minutes. On Oct 9 the attacker pulled 1,001 wstETH out on Ethereum and sent the last 782 into the bridge.

Incident · Sep 30, 2026

File #001 · NEAR Intents exploit

$3.87M left NEAR Intents' BNB Chain wallet. We followed it across three chains until the exploiter sent it back.