F1Three quarters of the money became Bitcoin, and at our Oct 2 snapshot it had not moved since Oct 1
Verified
Between 02:59 and 13:00 UTC on Oct 1, 34.69 BTC arrived at one Bitcoin address in 24 incoming transactions. It was then split into new addresses. At the snapshot, 34.59 BTC sat unspent in five of them. Bitquery reported the same 34.69 BTC in four wallets at its Oct 1 snapshot. Since then two of those wallets moved their BTC on, which is why we count five at Oct 2.
Evidence: Bitcoin section below, all five addresses with balances.
F2The Bitcoin route runs through the drain wallets' own addresses on Ethereum
VerifiedChainflip payout inferred
The same addresses, 0x09fd…ad37 and 0xde85…6b1c, are active on Ethereum. They sent 642 ETH into 18 single-use contracts that forward to "Chainflip 1", and 132.8 ETH to THORChain. The THORChain leg is proven by memos on both chains. The Chainflip payout to Bitcoin is matched on timing and amount only.
Evidence: ETH 0xa10c7bc3…8578 ↔ BTC a19f6862…7faf (memo OUT:A10C7BC3…)
F3The drain started Sep 30, after two test withdrawals
Verified
10 USDT at 18:57, 11 USDT at 20:05, then 800,000 USDT at 23:54 UTC on Sep 30. Four more withdrawals followed on Oct 1. The total is exactly 3,865,021 USDT. Bitquery counts five withdrawals because it leaves out the two tests.
Evidence: withdrawals 1–7 in the ledger.
F4The vault paid out because it was handed signed withdrawals
VerifiedMechanism unknown
The drain wallet called the vault directly. Each call named a token, a recipient and an amount, with a 65-byte signature, and the vault accepted all seven. That fits NEAR Intents' statement that the bug sat in the Omni deposit and withdrawal system. Who produced the signatures is for the postmortem.
Evidence: input data of 0x0381265d…8220.
F5750 BNB went back into the vault being drained
Verified
Three new wallets deposited 300, 350 and 100 BNB into the NEAR Intents contract between 01:15 and 02:36 UTC on Oct 1. The 650 BNB came through CoW Eth Flow orders placed seconds earlier. The total matches Bitquery's figure. Where NEAR Intents delivered those funds is not visible on BNB Chain.
Evidence: 0xb6bca515…3144, 0x281f0bb8…83eb, 0xa11b8bfd…270a.
F6About 800 BNB reached a wallet labelled KuCoin, and 150 BNB one labelled HitBTC
VerifiedExchange labels attributed
800 BNB passed through 0xcd87…b262, which forwarded every payment within minutes to the wallet Etherscan labels "KuCoin 28". Bitquery reported about $802k to KuCoin across two routes at its Oct 1 snapshot. We have confirmed one route, worth about $616k.
Evidence: e.g. 0x0e0058d9…c68c.
F723 single-use deposit addresses belong to Relay
Verified
2,318 BNB went into one-time addresses that were emptied within seconds into Relay's contracts: 1,833 BNB in 18 addresses from the drain wallets, and 485 BNB in 5 more from 0x36b4…de7a Updated v0.5. Relay's own records for 13 of them show USDT or USDC coming out on Ethereum.
Evidence: BSC 0x1aeb17e8…9d84 → Relay request 0x1790…4c4c → ETH 0x0123691d…3670.
F8Two wallets sent dust to an address labelled Lazarus. This does not establish attribution
No attribution
On-chain, the reported "Lazarus link" is two small payments into the labelled address: 0.001 BNB at 13:34 and 0.049 BNB at 13:37 UTC, after the announcement. Anyone can send money to any address.
Evidence: 0x12deb304…1287, 0x58895b5b…a982.
F9Look-alike addresses copied the drain wallet's transfers
Verified
Addresses sharing the first and last characters of the real destinations sent zero-value USDT and fake "USDT" in matching amounts (500,000, 429,999, 329,999). This is address poisoning. We filtered it before counting any flow.
Evidence: e.g. 0xde8546d3…6b1c imitating 0xde85b959…6b1c.
F10The Relay money came back to the drain wallets as ETH New in v0.5
Verified for 6 of 126 routes unresolved
On Ethereum, each Relay payout we could follow landed in a single-use forwarder contract. Within about a minute a contract named "Sweeper" swept it, swapped the USDT for ETH through a shared execution contract (0x067c…0c67) and delivered the result. Six of those deliveries went straight back to the drain cluster: 24.08 ETH to 0x09fd…ad37, 115.73 ETH in four payments to 0xde85…6b1c, and 31.20 ETH to 0x36b4…de7a. That is 171.01 ETH that crossed to Ethereum through Relay and returned to the same wallets that fed Chainflip and THORChain. Where the other six sweeps delivered is not resolved yet. 0x067c…0c67 is a busy shared contract, not an attacker address.
Evidence: ETH 0xc73010ea…e25f (114,475 USDT → 42.44 ETH to 0xde85), 0xfa8fec3e…be24 (→ 24.08 ETH to 0x09fd), 0xf7813d28…45af (→ 31.20 ETH to 0x36b4).
F11The exploiter replied on-chain, paid for through Arbitrum New in v0.6
VerifiedRecovery wallet as reportedOriginal source unresolved
At 10:22:18 UTC on Oct 2 the drain wallet 0x09fd…ad37 sent 1 BNB to 0xb18a…c0e7, reported as NEAR Intents' recovery wallet, with this text in the transaction: "Willing to cooperate, reply with your Signal so contact is possible." It is a message, not a return; no funds have come back. The BNB for it took a short, deliberate path: 813.43 USDC left a brand-new Arbitrum wallet (0xc9a9…bbb6) at 10:18:22 through LI.FI and a Mayan Swift order, arrived as 1.046 BNB at another brand-new wallet (0xcb4a…fef6) at 10:18:27, passed through a third (0xfbc1…e30e) at 10:20 and reached the drain wallet at 10:21:25. Each of those wallets had no history. The Arbitrum wallet's USDC came from 0x7405…f6fc, which pays users on Arbitrum and is repaid minutes later through Hyperliquid's Bridge2 contract: the pattern of a fast-withdrawal service. Which Hyperliquid account it served here is not yet resolved.
Evidence: BSC 0x86517ba3…e10b (message), 0x8e1c34fe…70fe, 0x7e0aae87…1281, 0x8e740a75…6eb5 (Mayan fill, order 0x16689aea…375d); Arbitrum 0x2baf42f6…1fb1 (LI.FI → Mayan, 813.43 USDC).
F12The 120 BNB became Monero tokens on Hyperliquid in 44 seconds New in v0.7
VerifiedXMR1 issuer as named by Hyperliquid
At 00:54:43 UTC on Oct 1, 0x0e77…8616 sent 120 BNB into LI.FI. LI.FI and Mayan delivered 90,285.96 USDC to the same address on Arbitrum at 00:54:48. At 00:55:01 that address deposited all of it into Hyperliquid, moved it to its spot wallet, and between 00:55:19 and 00:55:27 bought XMR1 four times for 90,281.68 USDC at about $546. XMR1 is listed on Hyperliquid as "XMR - Wagyu.xyz", a token that stands for Monero. The account still holds 165.30 XMR1 and 4.28 USDC; it has made no transfer or withdrawal. Redeemed for Monero, the money would leave the public record, so this account is now watched. It did not pay for the Oct 2 message (F11), which came out of Hyperliquid through a different, unidentified account.
Evidence: BSC 0x145e137c…bb57; Arbitrum 0xd631c308…ba64 (USDC in), 0xcee78a68…ee5a (deposit to Hyperliquid Bridge2); Hyperliquid account 0x0e77cbf891b90c73e2fc5dff6d78ec2e383c8616: deposit, spot transfer and fills 0x81f121f9…1fe2, 0x500f3153…3b2b, 0x37ec1223…9838, 0x5c38d06e…c5b0.