Onchain Files
File #004 · Bitget hot-wallet hack: where $387M wentMONITORINGv1.4 · findings locked · Oct 13, 2026

Out through every bridge. Into Bitcoin.

Bitget hot wallets→Attacker 0x770b…63ee→THORChain→Chainflip→Circle CCTP→Stargate→deBridge→Bitcoin→CoinJoin

Bitget lost about $387.5M from its hot wallets on Sep 24, across nine chains, in under three hours. Over the next eleven days the money left every chain it was stolen on, through every cross-chain service that would take it, and most of it ended up in Bitcoin, where about 3,322 BTC is still sitting. On Oct 8 the attacker began mixing it: about 200 BTC has gone through CoinJoin rounds so far, about 84 BTC of it overnight on Oct 13. We followed it hop by hop. Every figure below is tied to a transaction.

≈ 387.5$MTaken in 23 transfers on 9 chains, Sep 24, 18:31–21:23 UTC (Bitget's figure; our chain count matches).
3,816BTCEntered 213 Bitcoin addresses the attacker named as swap destinations (Sep 24 – Oct 6).
≈ 3,322BTCStill unspent across the 1,995 addresses we count (Oct 13, 12:30 UTC). About 286 BTC moved since Oct 5, mostly on Oct 8, Oct 11 and Oct 13.
126swapsThrough Chainflip to Bitcoin (≈ 325.1 BTC), each tied to the attacker by its refund address. At least 14 more were refused.
MONITORING

Still held in Bitcoin

≈ 3,322 BTC

Mixed since Oct 8

≈ 200 BTC (CoinJoin)

Last move

Oct 13: 10 × 10 BTC lots split and ≈ 84 BTC mixed, 02:36–06:00 UTC

Last checked

Oct 13, 12:30 UTC

The findings are locked. The status bar updates when the watched addresses move. Additions are logged below.

Update v1.4 · Oct 13, 2026. A second mixing wave. At 00:36 UTC on Oct 13, nineteen watched holdings were spent in ten transactions, each making a lot of exactly 10 BTC (116.6 BTC). The lots were split into 3 BTC and 7 BTC pieces, and between 02:36 and 06:00 UTC ≈ 84 BTC went into CoinJoin rounds. About 200 BTC has now been mixed since Oct 8. A fresh count at 12:30 UTC: ≈ 3,322 BTC still unspent across the 1,995 addresses (≈ 86 BTC also moved on Oct 11). We keep following the pieces that have not been mixed.

Update v1.3 · Oct 9. The mixing has started. On Oct 8 at 08:38 UTC, in one block, twelve transactions each sent exactly 10 BTC (120 BTC) from watched holdings to fresh addresses. Each chunk was split into 1–4 BTC pieces and, within hours, fed into large CoinJoin rounds (106–357 inputs) whose outputs use Wasabi-style standard amounts (0.5 BTC, 3.874 BTC = 318 sats). By Oct 9, 01:27 UTC ≈ 116 of the 120 BTC had gone through at least 14 rounds; the rest sits in fresh addresses we watch. Bitcoin count re-run: ≈ 3,481 BTC still unspent (≈ 127 BTC moved Oct 5–9). Amounts out of a CoinJoin can no longer be followed one-to-one; we keep watching what has not yet been mixed.

Update v1.2 · Oct 6. Checked on-chain after our public-source sweep. Freezes confirmed: Tether and Circle have blacklisted 0xe07b…7d57 (Etherscan: "Bitget Exploiter 8"), which still holds 218,022.97 USDT and 99,989.91 USDC (≈ $318K, frozen). Its ETH, about 1,528 ETH including 170.47 ETH moved two days after the freeze, went on to 0xa6dd…5545 and the THORChain route. The first transfer was 0.84 ETH at 18:31:11 UTC from "Bitget 6" (tx 0xc195…7be6); Bitget's CEO later described a 0.184 ETH test, but the chain shows 0.84. TRON: the receiving address Bitget published, TBWN…YwKD, paid its TRX to the same 22 wallets our TRON leg already follows; it is now watched. New context below: the cause as reported by SlowMist and Mandiant, and Bitget's recovery bounty.

Update v1.1 · Oct 5, evening. Two legs resolved after publication. TRON: the stolen TRX was swapped to USDT and bridged through USDT0 to 15 Ethereum wallets (≈ 6.06M USDT), then into THORChain and Chainflip: no longer an open end. ≈ 864.6k USDC sent through LayerZero landed directly in Chainflip deposit addresses on Arbitrum (5 swaps, 10.28 BTC). Chainflip total: 126 swaps, ≈ 325.1 BTC. New Bitcoin count: 3,815.59 BTC entered 213 attacker-named addresses; ≈ 3,607.82 BTC still unspent across 1,995 addresses.

Current exposure

Stolen$387.5M
Returned—
Frozen$606K
Still traceable≈ $276.4M

Where it can still be stopped

  • Already frozen · $606,467 USDT + USDC + ≈ $503K at NEAR Intents.
  • Monitored, not freezable today · BTC held in self-custody. If it reaches an exchange or a service, that is the moment to act; we watch for it around the clock.
  • Bounty open · Bitget hot-wallet hack: 5% of successfully frozen funds + 5% of successfully recovered funds, to the eligible person/entity whose voluntary efforts DIRECTLY resulted in the freeze/recovery. FIRST submitter of a given lead wins (by submission time). Keep the reference shown after submitting. Actions under court/LE orders excluded.. Official channel: Bitget submission portal (support article 12560603896108) and LazarusBounty (lazarusbounty.com) · tips: trace.bgblockchain.xyz/report.
  • Law enforcement · a full evidence pack (every transaction, CSV) is available on request.

The claim

"Bitget's backend wallet system was compromised and transaction data spoofed; a vulnerability in a third-party security product may have exposed internal credentials. Keys and cold wallets were not compromised. Loss revised to about $387.5M."

Bitget, incident page and support article (Sep 25) Project-reported

"A zero-day in a third-party security product, exploited from Aug 31, led to an employee's credentials, a web shell on the product's appliance and a move to the wallet job server; a custom tool forged risk-control parameters for the withdrawals. The vendor is not named."

SlowMist and Mandiant findings as reported by The Hacker News and Cointelegraph (Oct 2026) Project-reported

"Recovery bounty: 5% of funds frozen and 5% of funds voluntarily returned; tips at trace.bgblockchain.xyz/report. Actions under court orders or for law enforcement are excluded."

Bitget support article, Sep 25 Project-reported

"About 3,386 BTC after roughly $269M through THORChain and $37M through Chainflip; about $840K frozen (Tether and Circle ≈ $340K, NEAR Intents ≈ $503K)."

BlockSec, Sep 29 Attributed

"Patterns consistent with North Korean groups (Bitget); “likely North Korea attack” (TRM Labs). No government attribution."

Bitget and TRM Labs. Not our finding: we do not attribute identity. Attributed

The evidence

  • Verified

    Frozen, confirmed on-chain Oct 6: 218,022.97 USDT and 99,989.91 USDC on 0xe07b…7d57 (Etherscan tag "Bitget Exploiter 8"): both Tether's and Circle's contracts report the address as blacklisted. About 1,528 ETH that passed through it was not freezable and went on to the THORChain route.

  • Verified

    23 transfers left Bitget-labelled wallets on Sep 24 between 18:31 and 21:23 UTC, on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Optimism, Base, Avalanche, BNB Chain, XRP Ledger, Zcash and TRON. All EVM theft went to one address, 0x770b…63ee, the address Bitget published.

  • Direct link

    ≥ 23,630 ETH was swapped to Bitcoin through THORChain from the Ethereum side, and about 90% of the 103M stolen XRP through THORChain's XRP vaults. Every swap names its Bitcoin destination in the attacker's own memo.

  • Direct link

    126 Chainflip swaps → ≈ 325.1 BTC, each naming an attacker wallet as refund address. 73 of them were funded by CoW Swap orders whose receiver was the Chainflip deposit address, so the deposit came from CoW's contract, not from an attacker wallet.

  • Direct link

    Every other bridge resolved from its own records: Circle CCTP (41.33M USDC in 34 burns, mostly back to the attacker on Ethereum, 2.41M to Solana), Stargate/LayerZero (≈ 6,740 ETH to 10 fresh Arbitrum wallets, 136 ETH to Linea), deBridge (105.79 ETH from Linea; two orders cancelled). TRON: the stolen TRX became ≈ 6.06M USDT, bridged through USDT0 to 15 Ethereum wallets, then into THORChain and Chainflip.

  • Verified

    3,815.59 BTC entered 213 Bitcoin addresses the attacker provably chose; ≈ 3,607.82 BTC of it is still unspent across 1,995 addresses (haircut count, method below).

  • Inferred

    The attacker paid gas with the stolen funds and used fresh wallets throughout: no pre-hack wallet on any EVM chain. Consistent with control of Bitget's own signing systems.

The unknown

  • Unknown

    Where ≈ 9,000 ZEC went after entering Zcash's shielded pool. The chain stops showing it there.

  • Unknown

    ATOM, ALGO and TIA: Bitget lists them as affected; we found no transfers.

  • Unknown

    ≈ 1.30M USDC and 495.6 WETH sent through LayerZero's multicall contract that are not LayerZero messages; two small 0x swaps.

  • Project-reported

    The NEAR Intents freeze (≈ $503K) is reported by BlockSec; we have not confirmed it ourselves. (The Tether and Circle freeze is confirmed: see evidence.)

  • Unknown

    Who the attacker is. Onchain Files does not publish identities; leads go privately to Bitget, the services involved and law enforcement.

01 · The window

Nine chains in under three hours.

A 0.84 ETH test at 18:31 UTC, then the large transfers from 18:58. By 19:16 every chain had been hit. A second wave at 20:09 and the last ETH at 21:23. Every transfer went to an address the attacker controlled.

2026-09-24 · UTC

Hover a marker for the transaction

Chart loading…

EVM transfers only (all to 0x770b…63ee). XRP (2.25M, 91.42M, 9.31M), Zcash (17,197.72 + 1,719 ZEC) and TRON (20.59M TRX) left in the same window; see the ledger.

02 · Key findings

What the chain shows.

F1

Most of it became Bitcoin

Direct linkVerified

THORChain carried the bulk: at least 23,630 ETH from the Ethereum side and about 90% of the 103M stolen XRP, each swap naming its Bitcoin address in the attacker's own memo. Chainflip carried 126 more swaps (≈ 325.1 BTC). Counting only Bitcoin that entered the 213 addresses the attacker named, and letting each address pass on only its share of what it received, 3,815.59 BTC entered and ≈ 3,607.82 BTC was still unspent on Oct 5 (≈ 3,322 BTC on Oct 13, see F2), typically 12–26 BTC per address, one or two hops from a THORChain or Chainflip payout. That is close to BlockSec's ≈ 3,386 BTC on Sep 29; the swaps after that date explain the difference.

Evidence: Census Oct 5: 14,325 Bitcoin addresses read, 8 hops. Largest holdings bc1q3q57…7mw 25.99 BTC, bc1qzacw…csw 25.38 BTC, bc1q5783…vwvz 22.13 of 42.06 BTC.

F2

Oct 8: the mixing starts

VerifiedInferred

Twelve transactions in one block (08:38 UTC) sent exactly 10 BTC each to fresh addresses, 120 BTC in round chunks. Each chunk was cut into 1–4 BTC pieces and joined large CoinJoin rounds within hours: 14 rounds by Oct 9, 01:27 UTC, 106–357 inputs each. ≈ 116 BTC of the 120 has gone in. The rounds' output amounts follow Wasabi's standard denominations (powers of 2 and 3, 1-2-5 steps), so we call them Wasabi-style; that label is our inference from the amounts, not from a service record. Then a second wave: on Oct 13 at 00:36 UTC, 19 holdings were spent in ten transactions that each made a lot of exactly 10 BTC (116.6 BTC in all). Within two hours the lots were split into 3 BTC and 7 BTC pieces, and between 02:36 and 06:00 UTC ≈ 84 BTC of them went into CoinJoin rounds. The remaining ≈ 3,322 BTC (Oct 13 count) has not moved.

Evidence: Split txs e.g. 647484a3…1d86, 1d3e0b4b…3078 (block 970,466). Rounds e.g. 10c5e192…8739 (225 in), fabf338b…4210 (155 in), 0cc3afc5…d57b (106 in), 362545470bd8… (357 in). Census of the 1,995 addresses re-run Oct 9.

F3

Chainflip: refused, then routed around

Direct link

swap.chainflip.io refused the attacker's direct ETH deposits on Sep 28–29 and sent them back. Within minutes the same money came back smaller, through new channels, or through CoW Swap: 73 orders whose receiver was a Chainflip deposit address. Then the deposit came from CoW's settlement contract, not an attacker wallet, and all 73 went through (21.29M USDC → 252.53 BTC). Only the refund address, the attacker's own, gives them away.

Evidence: Chainflip public status API (same data as scan.chainflip.io), 126 completed swaps; e.g. swap 1865134: 406,386.49 USDC → 4.8166 BTC, refund 0x8fd5…5994.

F4

A bridge for every chain

Direct linkAttributed

Each route was resolved from the service's own records. Circle CCTP: 34 burns, 41.33M USDC, 38.92M of it minted back to attacker wallets on Ethereum and 2.41M to Solana, where it became SOL and went into Chainflip. Stargate/LayerZero: ≈ 6,740 ETH to 10 fresh Arbitrum wallets and 136 ETH to Linea. deBridge: three Linea orders (105.79 ETH) delivered to a new Ethereum wallet that then made 20 small Chainflip swaps. On TRON, the TRX was swapped to USDT and bridged through USDT0 (≈ 6.06M USDT) to Ethereum, where it joined the THORChain and Chainflip routes.

Evidence: Circle Iris API, LayerZero Scan API, deBridge order API; contract names from verified source.

F5

Two orders cancelled, many swaps refused

VerifiedDirect link

Services did push back. Chainflip refused at least 14 deposits (≈ 658 ETH and 7,143.5 SOL), all refunded to attacker wallets. A 1,536 ETH deBridge order placed through MetaMask's bridge on Base was cancelled and refunded 22 minutes later; the attacker then used Stargate instead. Refusals slowed the money; none stopped it.

Evidence: Chainflip FAILED states; deBridge order 0x7e5c5480… state ClaimedOrderCancel (Base tx 0xc4920959…, refund 0x40410f5c…).

F6

$44M through a swap service, back to the hub

Verified

28 payments, 26.1M USDT, 14.0M USDC and 1,200 XAUt, went into one unverified contract that was busy with other users' swaps before the hack. Each swap paid ETH straight back to the attacker's hub 0x7c96…3e1c (e.g. 5M USDT → 1,855.80 ETH). Not an exit: the ETH joined the THORChain and Chainflip routes. Counted once.

Evidence: tx 0x69803df4…, 0x322f471d…, 0x57b4bec8…, 0x11c55236…

F7

No pre-hack wallet

VerifiedInferred

Every attacker wallet we checked was first active during the hack window, and its first gas came from the Bitget wallets that lost the money: 0.84 ETH at 18:31 from the same hot wallet that then paid out 34.75M USDT. No ENS names, NFTs, deployed contracts or airdrops. Consistent with control of Bitget's signing systems; nothing points to an older wallet.

Evidence: Funding walk-back on every chain; 266 attacker wallets, 4,342 transactions.

F8

Where the chain goes dark

Unknown

About 9,000 ZEC went into Zcash's shielded pool, where amounts and recipients are hidden. That, the unlisted ATOM/ALGO/TIA and about $1.8M of smaller paths are the open ends.

Evidence: Zcash shielding txs e.g. 8771fbe1…d7f9 (1,004.02 ZEC); ATOM/ALGO/TIA: no transfers found in Bitget's or Bitquery's records.

03 · The whole trail

Every edge shows its evidence. Click one.

A green line is a direct link from a service's own record (memo, refund address, order). A grey line is a transfer we read on-chain. Times UTC.

VICTIM · SEP 24 ATTACKER ROUTES NOW SINCE OCT 8 Bitget hot wallets4 hot wallets 0x770b…63ee6 EVM chains XRP · Zcash · TRON3 more addresses THORChain≥ 23,630 ETH + XRP Chainflip126 swaps · ≈ 325.1 BTC CCTP · Stargate · deBridge41.3M USDC + ≈ 6,980 ETH Zcash shielded pool≈ 9,000 ZEC Bitcoin≈ 3,322 BTC held CoinJoin rounds≈ 200 BTC · Oct 8–13

Click or tap any line in the map to see its evidence: status, transactions, time and amount.

Verified transferDirect cross-chain linkInferred linkNamed by label

Amounts are what we could tie to a transaction. Bridge legs that returned to the attacker's own addresses are counted once.

04 · Evidence map

Every link, and what supports it.

LinkEvidenceStatus
Bitget → 0x770b (EVM)17 transfers read on six chainsVerified
Sender wallets are Bitget'sExplorer labels, Bitquery; Bitget's own address listAttributed
Ethereum/XRP → Bitcoin via THORChainSwap memos + OUT: payoutsDirect link
126 Chainflip swapsRefund address = attacker wallet, in Chainflip's recordDirect link
CCTP burns → mintsCircle attestations, 34 of 34Direct link
Stargate/LayerZeroLayerZero Scan + destination receiptsDirect link
deBridge ordersOrder records: maker = attacker walletDirect link
$44M swap service → ETH back to hubInternal transfers in each swapVerified
≈ 3,608 BTC still heldHaircut count over 14,325 addressesVerified
Key-compromise readingGas paid from victim wallets; no pre-hack walletInferred
Attribution to a state groupBitget, TRM LabsAttributed
ZEC after shieldingNot visible on-chainUnknown
Verified
  • 23 theft transfers on 9 chains
  • ≈ 3,608 BTC unspent in 1,995 addresses (Oct 5)
  • $44M swap-service leg returned as ETH to the attacker hub
Inferred
  • Control of Bitget's signing systems (gas paid from victim wallets)
  • Routing through CoW hid the depositor from Chainflip's screening
Attributed
  • Contract names (verified source)
  • Bitget wallet labels
  • State-group attribution (Bitget, TRM Labs)
Project-reported
  • Root cause: third-party security product (Bitget)
  • Freezes ≈ $840K (BlockSec)
Unknown
  • ≈ 9,000 ZEC in the shielded pool
  • ATOM, ALGO, TIA
  • Who the attacker is

How we count Bitcoin: we start only from addresses the attacker named as swap destinations (THORChain memos, Chainflip and deBridge records). Their inflow in the window is the attacker money entering Bitcoin. From there each address passes on only its proportional share. Raw balances on the trail add up to 8,044 BTC because the trail touches exchanges and large unrelated holders; that figure is not used.

05 · Timeline

In order.

Sep 24 · 18:31Test transfer: 0.84 ETH from a Bitget hot wallet to 0x770b…63ee
Sep 24 · 18:58–19:16Main wave on 9 chains: USDT, USDC, ETH, BNB, AVAX, XAUt, XRP, ZEC, TRX
Sep 24 · 19:09First 5M USDT swapped to ETH through a swap service, paid to the hub 0x7c96; ETH heads for THORChain
Sep 24 · 20:09–21:23Second wave; last transfer 223.2 ETH
Sep 25Bitget publishes four attacker addresses Project-reported
Sep 25TRON: 20.59M TRX swapped to USDT and bridged through USDT0 to Ethereum (≈ 6.06M USDT)
Sep 25 – 28XRP leaves through THORChain's XRP vaults, ≈ 90% to Bitcoin
Sep 28 – 29Chainflip refuses direct ETH deposits; attacker switches to smaller amounts and CoW orders
Sep 28 – 3073 CoW-funded Chainflip swaps: 21.29M USDC → 252.53 BTC
Sep 29USDC bridged to Solana, swapped to SOL, into Chainflip: 13 swaps, 25.30 BTC
Sep 30 – Oct 3≈ 9,000 ZEC moved into Zcash's shielded pool
Oct 5Bitcoin count: ≈ 3,608 BTC still unspent in 1,995 addresses
Oct 8 · 08:38120 BTC split into 12 × 10 BTC in one block (block 970,466)
Oct 8 · 12:42First CoinJoin round with Bitget coins; by Oct 9 01:27 UTC ≈ 116 BTC through 14 rounds (Wasabi-style amounts)
Oct 9 · 04:20Bitcoin count re-run: ≈ 3,481 BTC still unspent
Oct 11≈ 86 BTC moved from counted holdings
Oct 13 · 00:3619 holdings consolidated into ten 10 BTC lots (116.6 BTC)
Oct 13 · 02:36Second mixing wave: ≈ 84 BTC into CoinJoin rounds by 06:00
Oct 13 · 12:30Bitcoin count re-run: ≈ 3,322 BTC still unspent

06 · Ledger

The transactions.

The theft transfers on the EVM chains and the key exits we cite. XRP, Zcash and TRON transfers are listed in the method notes.

Transactions
UTCEventAmountTransaction
Sep 24 · 18:31:11Test transfer, Bitget 0x1ab4 → 0x770b0.84 ETH0xc19560f5…7be6
Sep 24 · 18:58:59Bitget 0x1ab4 → 0x770b34,751,168.12 USDT0xa3ae35a0…9ce5
Sep 24 · 19:01:20Bitget 0x1ab4 → 0x770b19,668,851.77 USDT00xd032320a…84e3
Sep 24 · 19:01:23Bitget 0x1ab4 → 0x770b12,852,046.24 USDC0x40903fbe…d7ae
Sep 24 · 19:01:23Bitget 0x5bdf → 0x770b3,000.32 XAUt0xa976f040…9d29
Sep 24 · 19:01:29Bitget 0x5bdf → 0x770b5,737.68 ETH0xf1a2fe16…cc2c
Sep 24 · 19:01:33Bitget 0x97b9 → 0x770b1,555.32 ETH0x7692aacb…f5c8
Sep 24 · 19:01:35Bitget 0x1ab4 → 0x770b7,130.86 ETH0x67a7ac52…930c
Sep 24 · 19:08:59Swap service pays ETH back to the hub 0x7c965M USDT → 1,855.80 ETH0x69803df4…b4e1
Sep 24 · 19:16:14Bitget 0xffa8 → 0x770b12,719.46 BNB0xd456a403…6903
Sep 24 · 19:16:15Bitget 0xffa8 → 0x770b821,011.97 AVAX0x98659b02…ddd6
Sep 24 · 19:16:23Bitget 0xffa8 → 0x770b13,965.93 ETH0x8469803a…0bfa
Sep 24 · 19:231,536 ETH deBridge order via MetaBridge (later cancelled)1,550.30 ETH0xc4920959…f876
Sep 24 · 19:43deBridge refunds the cancelled order1,536.73 ETH0x40410f5c…cfa8
Sep 24 · 20:09:11Bitget 0x1ab4 → 0x770b1,879.20 ETH0xdd07e880…f606
Sep 24 · 20:09:23Bitget 0xffa8 → 0x770b1,395.90 ETH0x0c63cd7d…e97e
Sep 24 · 20:55:07Bitget 0x1ab4 → 0x770b8,204,678.80 USDC0x4d2d95da…4499
Sep 24 · 21:23:11Bitget 0x1ab4 → 0x770b (last)223.20 ETH0x23055829…9afb
Sep 28 · 10:55:32deBridge order, Linea → Ethereum (fulfilled)39.96 ETH0x7f71bb36…f610
Sep 29 · 14:38CoW order: receiver = Chainflip deposit 0x5a00…eef0150 ETH → 406,386.49 USDC0xf12a0542…52de
Sep 29 · 14:49Chainflip swap 1865134 payout to bc1q6x47…hu004.81658118 BTC93118d607b…88a9
Oct 8 · 08:3810 BTC chunk to a fresh address (1 of 12 in the same block)10 BTC647484a3a5…1d86
Oct 8 · 14:58CoinJoin round (155 inputs) taking Bitget pieces≈ 8.2 BTC from one chunkfabf338bd5…4210

Download every transaction behind this File (CSV): chain, time, from, to, amount, status and an explorer link for each. Check any line yourself.

07 · Method and standard

How we know.

Our engine traced from Bitget's published attacker addresses on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Optimism, Base, Avalanche, BNB Chain and Linea (fake tokens and look-alike addresses filtered), crawled the XRP Ledger with swap memos, and read Zcash, TRON and Solana. Bridges were resolved from each service's public records: THORChain memos, Chainflip's swap status API, Circle's attestation API, LayerZero Scan, deBridge's order API. Bitcoin was read through Esplora and Blockstream's API: 14,325 addresses, 8 hops. The Bitcoin count starts only at addresses the attacker named as swap destinations and passes on each address's proportional share (haircut). Contract names come from verified source code. XRP theft txs: 9926E440…25F4, 8DF2ECF6…4195, 41EFBB55…D42A; Zcash: 998042f9…4489, 1ed1fbe0…ec36; TRON: ce9b366c…d13f. Dollar totals are Bitget's.

Verified

Read on-chain by us. A direct link is proven by records on both chains.

Inferred

Our deduction from patterns. The method is stated.

Attributed

Someone else's claim or label. The source is named.

Project-reported

A statement from the project involved.

Unknown

What we could not establish, listed.

Sources