Onchain Files

How do you know? · No. 01

How do you identify a hacker without knowing their name?

You don't start with a name.
You start with a transaction.

Public evidence only Identity: not public Funds: returned

A walk through the NEAR Intents exploit, from File #001. Every claim below links to the record.

01 — The incident

$3.87M left the vault. A wallet received it.

Between Sep 30, 18:57 and Oct 1, 06:08 UTC, NEAR Intents' BNB Chain vault paid out 3,865,021 USDT in seven withdrawals. Each was a signed instruction the vault accepted. The first two were tests: 10 and 11 USDT.

Taken · 7 withdrawals 3,865,021USDT

Matches NEAR Intents' reported figure to the dollar. Click a bar for its transaction.

Sep 30 18:5720:0523:54Oct 1 00:2400:5001:4606:08
The receiving wallet

0x09fd1f5d9f185067a92493e43aa259ea4ab3ad37

First transactionSep 28, 20:42 UTC
Receivedall 7 withdrawals
Also active onEthereum, same address
Ownerunknown
At this point, we know a wallet.We don't know a person. That's the distinction this whole page is about.

02 — Start with the wallet

The wallet is not the identity. It is an identity anchor.

Everything that happens next can be tied back to this address. The first thing it reveals is that it isn't alone: the same operator works several wallets, and the money flows between them.

  • Verified0x09fd…ad37 funded 0xde85…6b1c with 929,999 USDT, five minutes after the fourth withdrawal.
  • VerifiedBoth addresses are active on Ethereum. A bridge call on BNB Chain named 0x09fd as its own recipient on the other side.
  • VerifiedMoney came back. 171 ETH of Relay payouts landed in 0x09fd, 0xde85 and a third wallet, 0x36b4…de7a.
0x09fd…ad37 0xde85…6b1c 0x36b4…de7a 929,999 USDT 330,000 USDT via 0x62eb 171 ETH of Relay payouts came back to all three

A cluster: wallets tied together by the money itself, not by a label.

03 — Follow the money

Every edge is a transaction. Click one.

From the vault to Bitcoin, across three chains. Each box opens the evidence for the money that reached it: status, time, amount and the transaction itself.

SourceAnchorFirst exit · BNB ChainNext hopTo BitcoinCollectedEnd
Verified transferProven across chainsInferredExchange label (attributed)

04 — Now the interesting part

Don't ask "who is this?" Ask "what does this wallet touch?"

Identity leaks through contact: an exchange account, a service with records, a habit. Here is everything the cluster touched, and what each contact can and cannot say about who is behind it.

SignalWhat the chain showsStatusWhat it says about identity
Drain wallet 0x09fd…ad37Received all seven withdrawals, 3,865,021 USDT.VerifiedThe anchor. Who controls it: unknown.
Wallet cluster0x09fd funded 0xde85 and others; Relay payouts came back to all three.VerifiedOne operator, several wallets.
KuCoin-labelled wallet800 BNB in 7 sweeps through 0xcd87…b262, which forwarded each payment within minutes.AttributedThe strongest lead: forwarding like this is how exchange deposit addresses behave, and a deposit address belongs to one account.
HitBTC-labelled walletAbout 150 BNB from two wallets on the route.AttributedA second exchange contact.
Relay, Chainflip, THORChain2,318 BNB through Relay; 642 ETH into Chainflip; 132.8 ETH through THORChain.VerifiedRoutes, not identity. They show where the money went.
Bitcoin collector34.69 BTC arrived at one address in about two dozen payments.VerifiedOne destination for most of the money: a single point to watch.
Hyperliquid account 0x0e77…8616120 BNB became 165.3 XMR1, a Monero token, in 44 seconds. Still held.VerifiedAn account on a trading venue, and an intent: Monero leaves the public record.
The Oct 2 messagePaid for from Arbitrum through LI.FI and Mayan, via brand-new wallets, four minutes before sending.VerifiedOperational care. Fresh wallets for every step.
Lazarus-labelled addressTwo dust payments into it, 0.001 and 0.049 BNB, after the announcement.No attributionAnyone can send money to any address. A label touched is not an identity proven.
The personName, location, affiliation.UnknownNot established in public.

05 — The identity ladder

How far can public evidence climb? Here, to level 3.

  1. LEVEL 0UnknownAn incident, no address.
  2. LEVEL 1Attack wallet identified0x09fd…ad37 received the withdrawals.
  3. LEVEL 2Wallet cluster identified0xde85, 0x36b4 and others, tied by the money.
  4. LEVEL 3Exchange and service contactKuCoin and HitBTC labels; a Hyperliquid account.Public evidence
  5. LEVEL 4Real-world account identifiedAn exchange or service links a deposit to a customer.NEAR's claim?
  6. LEVEL 5Individual independently corroboratedNamed, and confirmed by more than one source.
Where we stop

Public, on-chain evidence for this case reaches level 3. Onchain Files publishes up to here. Leads that point at a person go privately to the affected protocol or to law enforcement, never onto this site.

Why level 3 matters

Level 3 is the hinge. Once money touches an exchange deposit address, the exchange can connect it to an account it knows. That step happens off-chain, outside anyone's public view.

06 — Then the question

So how did NEAR say "We have identified you"?

NEAR Intents' general manager posted it on Oct 2 at 00:18 UTC, with a 48-hour deadline and three return addresses. He did not say how. What followed is on the record:

  1. "We have identified you." Return addresses published, including bc1qjhv3…zxey for Bitcoin. Reported

  2. The drain wallet writes to NEAR's recovery wallet, on-chain: Willing to cooperate, reply with your Signal so contact is possible. Verified

  3. All 34.59 BTC is swept into bc1qjhv3…zxey, the address NEAR had published fourteen hours earlier. Verified

  4. A second message from the drain wallet: We've returned all the funds, we were in the wrong. NEAR Intents says the same. Verified

Inferred · our reading, not NEAR's statement

The most likely route ran through level 3.

The cluster sent about 950 BNB to wallets labelled KuCoin and HitBTC. Exchanges know who owns their deposit addresses, and they answer to victims and to law enforcement. That is the usual way a wallet becomes a name, and it would explain how NEAR could say "identified" without publishing anything.

NEAR never said so. So we can't claim the attacker's real-world identity, and we don't. What we can do is reconstruct the financial identity: everything this actor did, tied to the record.

07 — Reconstruct the digital identity

The digital fingerprint. Not a name, a pattern.

No single trait identifies anyone. Together they make activity attributable to the same actor, the next time it shows up.

Anchor0x09fd…ad37

Created Sep 28, two days before the drain.

TimingTest, then drain

10 and 11 USDT first; 800,000 USDT at 23:54, sold for BNB within four minutes.

Address reuseSame address, two chains

0x09fd and 0xde85 on BNB Chain and on Ethereum.

MovementSpray, then gather

23 single-use Relay addresses out; one Bitcoin collector in.

Bridge choiceFour routes at once

Relay, MetaMask Bridge, Chainflip, THORChain, plus LI.FI and Mayan.

Exchange contactTwo labelled exchanges

800 BNB toward KuCoin, 150 BNB toward HitBTC.

Privacy intentMonero token

120 BNB into 165.3 XMR1 on Hyperliquid, never redeemed.

Operational habitsFresh wallets for the message

Arbitrum → LI.FI → Mayan → two new wallets → the drain wallet, in four minutes.

=A unique on-chain behaviour.You don't necessarily know who they are. You increasingly know which activity belongs to them.

08 — The money trail

3,865,021 USDT, and where each part went.

Every transaction leaves a trace.Onchain Files follows it.

09 — What we know

The record, and its edge.

Established on-chain

  • The exploit: 3,865,021 USDT in seven signed withdrawals.
  • The attacker's wallet and its cluster.
  • The route across BNB Chain, Ethereum and Bitcoin.
  • Contact with two exchange-labelled wallets and a Hyperliquid account.
  • The Bitcoin swept into NEAR's published return address.

Not established

  • The attacker's real-world name.
  • Their location.
  • Any link to Lazarus. A labelled address received dust; that proves nothing.
  • How NEAR obtained identifying information.
  • Who produced the withdrawal signatures.
On-chain data first.
Attribution only when supported.

We show the evidence chain and let you inspect it. You don't have to trust our conclusion; every link above opens the transaction it rests on.