Actors · Lazarus Group (DPRK)
Same people. Same playbook.
Eight heists since February 2025, about $2.6 billion.
How North Korea's hackers get in, how the money moves, and where it can still be stopped.
North Korean hackers stole a record $2.02 billion in crypto in 2025 (Chainalysis). In 2026, two of their attacks made up 76% of all crypto hack losses through April (TRM Labs). This is what the public record says about how they work, plus one thing we found ourselves.
01 — The heists
Eight attacks since Bybit. Only one has an FBI attribution.
"Lazarus" is used loosely. Below, every row says who made the attribution and how firm it is. The FBI names the group behind Bybit TraderTraitor. Victims and security firms use the same name, or related ones, for most of the rest.
| Date | Victim · taken | Who says it was North Korea | How firm |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 21, 2025 | Bybit · ≈ $1.5B | FBI: "North Korea was responsible", TraderTraitor (PSA) | Authority |
| Oct 30, 2025 | Garden Finance · $11.4M | zeroShadow, published by Garden: DPRK-affiliated, high confidence (report) | Vendor |
| Nov 27, 2025 | Upbit · ≈ $30M | Korean government sources, unofficially; Lazarus suspected (Decrypt) | Suspected |
| Apr 1, 2026 | Drift · $285M | Drift with Mandiant and SEAL 911: DPRK, medium-high confidence; TRM, Elliptic agree (TRM) | Victim + vendors |
| Apr 18, 2026 | KelpDAO · $292M | LayerZero: TraderTraitor, preliminary; TRM agrees (TRM) | Vendors |
| Jun 8, 2026 | Humanity Protocol · ≈ $36M | Quantstamp: "DPRK-characteristic". Others disagree; some suspect a staged theft (rekt) | Disputed |
| Jul 22, 2026 | AFX Trade · $24.15M | AFX's post-mortem: consistent with TraderTraitor (Halborn) | Victim |
| Sep 24, 2026 | Bitget · $387.5M | Bitget's CEO: "very likely" DPRK; TRM: the same laundering network as Bybit and AFX (TRM). Our File #004 | Victim + vendors |
02 — How they get in
Not code bugs. People and the machines they trust.
- DriftMonths of relationship-building, then a signature. Council signers were led to pre-sign hidden admin actions (Solana durable nonces) after in-person contact through a fake trading firm. The drain took about 12 minutes.
- KelpDAOPoisoned infrastructure. Two LayerZero RPC nodes were poisoned while outside ones were knocked offline, so a single verifier approved a fake burn and released 116,500 rsETH.
- AFXA fake recruiter. A developer cloned a "test" repo with a malicious Git config. Thirteen days later, 5 of 7 validators co-signed a fraudulent withdrawal.
- BitgetA zero-day in a third-party security product. Credentials, then forged withdrawal commands. No private key was stolen.
- Humanity · GardenA booby-trapped ZIP and a stolen SSH key. Ordinary intrusions, aimed at the few people and servers that control the keys.
03 — The money path
Seven steps. Repeated heist after heist.
| Step | What they do | Seen in |
|---|---|---|
| 1 · Prep | Fresh wallets funded from Tornado Cash in 10 ETH lots, weeks ahead, with small test transfers. | Drift (10 ETH from Tornado on Mar 11, three weeks before), KelpDAO |
| 2 · Drain | Minutes, not hours. | KelpDAO: first move after 1 min 48 s. Drift: about 12 min. |
| 3 · Dump the stablecoins | Anything an issuer could freeze is swapped or bridged out first. | Bitget: $75.5M of USDT/USDC swapped in 41 min. Drift: ≈ $232M USDC moved through Circle's bridge in about 6 h, then into ETH. |
| 4 · Round lots | Holdings split into neat, even wallets. | Bitget: ≈ 10,000 ETH and 20M XRP per wallet. KelpDAO: 25,000 and 50,700 ETH lots. |
| 5 · ETH → Bitcoin | Mainly through THORChain, which needs no account. TRM says it "processed the vast majority" of the Bybit and KelpDAO proceeds. Also Chainflip, NEAR Intents and other bridges. | Bybit, KelpDAO, Bitget |
| 6 · Bitcoin side | Peel chains, Wasabi CoinJoin, then long waits. | Drift's ETH sat untouched for weeks. Bitget's BTC was regrouped into 10-BTC lots, then partly sent through CoinJoin (File #004). |
| 7 · Cash-out | Handed to brokers. TRM: laundering is "handled almost entirely by Chinese intermediaries, not the North Koreans themselves." | KelpDAO funding traced to a broker's wallet; the broker was indicted by the US Justice Department in 2023 (TRM) |
04 — The tell
They reuse their plumbing. That is how heists get linked.
- TRMKelpDAO → Bybit. KelpDAO's first Bitcoin, swapped through THORChain, landed in a wallet used in the Bybit laundering.
- VendorsHumanity → KelpDAO. Humanity's Bitcoin was mixed with KelpDAO's proceeds.
- TRMAFX → Bitget. AFX laundering wallets overlap with the Bitget laundering.
Bitget proceeds that passed through one wallet between Sep 28 and Oct 1, 2026, on their way to Bitcoin swaps.
05 — Where it can be stopped
The window is minutes to hours. Then it is Bitcoin.
- FreezableStablecoins, before the swap. Circle and Tether can freeze USDC and USDT. That is why step 3 is so fast. On Bitget, about $1.1M was frozen by Circle, Tether and NEAR Intents.
- FreezableChains with a council. Arbitrum's Security Council froze 30,766 ETH of KelpDAO's proceeds.
- RecordsSwap services and exchanges. Each order leaves a record: destination, refund address, sometimes an account. That is where identification starts, through victims and police.
- Dead endAfter CoinJoin, Monero or shielded Zcash. Once there, the trail is cold.
06 — What we do with this
We don't wait for the money to move. We watch the doors.
Our engine watches the places where this playbook has to pass: stablecoin holders, swap services, exchange deposits. It checks every new trail against the published wallets above. See the Bitget trail in File #004. If you've seen something linked to these heists, send a tip. If you lost funds, report a theft.
Sources: FBI PSA (Bybit) · TRM: 76% of 2026 losses · TRM: Drift · TRM: Bitget · Chainalysis: KelpDAO · Chainalysis 2025 (The Block) · Garden · rekt: Humanity · Halborn: AFX · BlockSec: Bitget. Amounts are as reported at the time. Corrections: @onchain_files.